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We give the first composable security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribution with
coherent states against collective attacks. Crucially, in the limit of large blocks the secret key rate
converges to the usual value computed from the Holevo bound. Combining our proof with either the
de Finetti theorem or the Postselection technique then shows the security of the protocol against
general attacks, thereby confirming the long-standing conjecture that Gaussian attacks are optimal
asymptotically in the composable security framework.
We expect that our parameter estimation procedure, which does not rely on any assumption
about the quantum state being measured, will find applications elsewhere, for instance for the
reliable quantification of continuous-variable entanglement in finite-size settings.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic
primitive that allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob,
who have access to an insecure quantum channel and
an authenticated classical channel, to distill a secret key.
QKD has spurred a lot of interest in the past decades
because it is arguably the first application of the field
of quantum information to reach commercial maturity
[1]. Despite a lot of effort invested in the theoretical
analysis of QKD protocols, composable security [2, 3] has
only been established for a handful of protocols, for in-
stance BB84 [4]. This major achievement is the latest
step in a series of more and more refined security proofs
and improved bounds for the secret key rates. More pre-
cisely, composable security proofs have successively used
an exponential version of the de Finetti theorem [5], the
Postselection technique [6] and an entropic uncertainty
principle [7].
The situation for continuous-variable (CV) protocols
is much less advanced [8]. These protocols [9, 10], which
do not require single-photon detectors, are particularly
appealing in terms of implementation [11] but their se-
curity is still far from being completely understood. Re-
cently, a composable security proof for a CV protocol was
obtained [12–14] from an entropic uncertainty principle
[15] but the protocol requires the generation of squeezed
states and is only moderately tolerant to losses. Other
approaches to establish the security of a protocol typi-
cally consist of two independent steps: first a composable
security proof valid against collective attacks, a restricted
type of attacks where the quantum state shared by Alice
and Bob protocol displays a tensor product structure,
followed by an additional argument to obtain security
against general attacks. These two steps have been par-
tially completed in the case of CV protocols: a reduction
from general to collective attacks is obtained via two pos-
sible techniques, namely a de Finetti theorem [16], and
the Postselection technique [17], the latter technique be-
ing more efficient but at the price of adding an unpracti-
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cal symmetrization step to the protocol (The Postselec-
tion technique should not be mistaken with the postse-
lection of data in certain protocols [18].). Unfortunately,
security against collective attacks has only been proved
(via a Gaussian optimality argument [19]) in the asymp-
totic limit, which does not say anything about compos-
able security [20–22]. Note also that finite-size effects for
CV QKD were partly explored in Ref. [23], but under a
Gaussian attack assumption.
In this paper, we give the first composable security
proof valid against collective attacks for CV QKD with
coherent states (We note that coherent states can also
be used in BB84 implementations, for instance in decoy-
state protocols, and that composable security has been
proved in Ref. [24].) and either direct or reverse recon-
ciliation [25]. The Postselection technique then implies
composable security against general attacks. Remark-
ably, the secret key rate is asymptotically equal to the
one assuming a Gaussian attack, which is not the case
for the proof based on the uncertainty principle. This
is crucial for the distribution of keys over long distances
[11].
To prove this result, we develop a number of techniques
including a tool for reliable tomography of the covari-
ance matrix without making any assumption about the
quantum state. By performing the Parameter Estima-
tion (PE) step after Error Correction (EC), we improve
the estimation and are able to use almost all the raw data
to distill the secret key. A similar strategy was also con-
sidered for BB84 in Ref. [26]. Our only assumptions are
that Alice and Bob have access to a classical authenti-
cated channel and that their equipment is trusted: they
can prepare coherent states and detect light with hetero-
dyne detection. Our framework can easily incorporate
imperfections either in the preparation or in the detec-
tion, as long as they are properly modeled. To keep the
notations simple, we will however assume that the equip-
ment of the legitimate parties is perfect.
Composable security.— An Entanglement-Based
(EB) QKD protocol E is a Completely-Positive Trace-
Preserving (CPTP) map E : HA ⊗ HB → SA ⊗ SB ⊗ C
that takes an arbitrary input state ρAB shared by Alice
2and Bob and outputs for each party a classical string SA
or SB, and some public transcript C. For a CV protocol,
bothHA andHB correspond to infinite-dimensional Fock
spaces, while SA,SB and C describe classical registers.
A QKD protocol should be secure, meaning that the
output keys should be identical and secret [7]. It should
also be robust, i.e. output nontrivial keys if there is no ac-
tive attack on the quantum channel. These are actually
properties of the output state of the protocol, more pre-
cisely of ρSASBE , which should hold for any input state.
In this paper, we denote by ρH the marginal of the state
ρ restricted to subspace H. The subscript E refers to
the quantum register HE of the adversary, and the final
state is obtained by applying the map E ⊗ idHE to an
arbitrary purification ΨABE of ρAB. A QKD protocol is
called correct if SA = SB for any strategy of the adver-
sary, that is, any initial state of the protocol ΨABE. A
protocol is ǫcor-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor. Denote by
HE′ = HE ⊗C the space accessible to the adversary (her
quantum system E and the public transcript C). A key
is called δ-secret if it is δ-close to a uniformly distributed
key that is uncorrelated with the eavesdropper:
1
2
∥∥∥ρSlAE′ − ωl ⊗ ρE′
∥∥∥
1
≤ δ, (1)
where ρlSAE′ is the state conditioned on the key length
l and ωl is the fully mixed state on classical strings of
length l. If the protocol aborts, it outputs a dummy key
of size 0, which is automatically secret. A QKD protocol
is called ǫsec-secret if for any attack strategy, it outputs
δ-secret keys with (1 − pabort)δ ≤ ǫsec, where pabort is
the abort probability. A QKD protocol is ǫ-secure if it
is ǫsec-secret and ǫcor-correct with ǫsec + ǫcor ≤ ǫ. Since
a protocol that would always abort is perfectly secure
according to this definition, it is important to take into
account its robustness ǫrob, which is the probability that
the protocol aborts if the eavesdropper is inactive. In
the case of a CV QKD protocol, this corresponds to a
thermal bosonic channel, which is a good model for the
transmission of light in an optical fiber.
Description of the CV QKD protocol E0.— We
focus here on the EB version of the protocol, but the
security of its Prepare and Measure (PM) version where
Alice sends coherent states and Bob uses heterodyne de-
tection follows immediately. Moreover, we present the
reverse reconciliation version, which is the most useful in
practice. The direct reconciliation version is easily ob-
tained by interchanging the roles of Alice and Bob in the
classical post-processing part of the protocol. Recall that
in order to obtain security against general attacks, one
would need to add another step to the protocol, involv-
ing an energy test as well as a potential symmetrization
procedure.
The protocol E0 is sketched in Fig. 1 (and detailed
in the appendix) and depends on a number of param-
eters: most notably, the number 2n of coherent states
sent by Alice, the length l of the final key if the protocol
did not abort, the discretization parameter d, the size of
Bob’s communication to Alice, leakEC, during the error
correction procedure, the maximum failure probabilities
ǫcor and ǫPE for the EC and PE steps, respectively, some
bounds on covariance matrix elements, Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c
for the PE test to pass and a robustness parameter ǫrob.
Our main result quantifies the security of the protocol
E0 in the composable security framework.
Theorem 1. The protocol E0 is ǫ-secure against collec-
tive attacks if ǫ =
√
ǫPE + ǫcor + ǫent+2ǫsm+ ǫ¯ and if the
key length l is chosen such that
l ≤2n
[
2HˆMLE(U)− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )
]
− leakEC
−∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2ǫ¯
, (2)
where HˆMLE(U) is the empirical entropy of U , ∆AEP :=√
2n
[
(d+ 1)2 + 4(d+ 1) log2
2
ǫ2sm
+ 2 log2
2
ǫ2ǫsm
]
+
4ǫsmd/ǫ, ∆ent := log2
1
ǫ +
√
8n log22(4n) log(2/ǫsm) and
f is the Holevo information between Eve and Bob’s
measurement result for a Gaussian state with covariance
matrix parametrized by Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c .
1. State Preparation: Alice prepares 2n two-mode
squeezed vacuum states, keeps the first half of each
state and transmits the second half to Bob through
an insecure quantum channel. Alice and Bob then
share a global quantum state ρ
⊗(2n)
AB
.
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob measure their re-
spective modes with heterodyne detection and ob-
tain two strings X,Y ∈ R4n. Bob discretizes his
4n-vector Y to obtain the m-bit string U , where
m = 4dn, i.e. each symbol is encoded with d bits
of precision.
3. Error Correction: Bob sends some side informa-
tion of size leakEC to Alice (syndrome of U for a lin-
ear error correcting code C agreed on in advance)
and Alice outputs a guess Uˆ for the string of Bob.
Bob computes a hash of U of length ⌈log2(1/ǫcor)⌉
and sends it to Alice who compares it with her own
hash. If both hashes differ, the protocol aborts.
4. Parameter Estimation: Bob sends nPE =
O(log(1/ǫPE)) bits of information to Alice that al-
low her to compute ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉, as well
as γa, γb and γc defined in Eq. 3, 4, 5. The PE test
passes if [γa ≤ Σ
max
a ] ∧ [γb ≤ Σ
max
b ] ∧ [γc ≥ Σ
min
c ];
otherwise the protocol aborts.
5. Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply a
random universal2 hash function to their respec-
tive strings, obtaining two strings SA and SB of
size l.
Figure 1: Protocol E0, with reverse reconciliation and param-
eters n, l, leakEC, ǫcor, nPE, ǫPE,Σ
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a ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c , d
3108 1010 1012 1014
100
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
2n, number of exchanged signals
r,
ex
pe
ct
ed
se
cr
et
ke
y
ra
te
Figure 2: Expected secret key rate r = (1− ǫrob)l/2n secure
against collective attacks, as a function of 2n, the number of
exchanged signals. From top to bottom, the transmittance
of the quantum channel corresponds to distances of 1 km,
10 km, 50 km and 100 km for assumed losses of 0.2 dB per
km. For each distance, the expected secret key rate reaches
the asymptotic value for large enough n. The modulation
variance is optimized, the reconciliation efficiency is set to
β = 0.95, the discretization parameter to d = 5 (the value of
d should be optimized depending on the error correcting codes
used in the reconciliation, see e.g. [27]), the excess noise to
ξ = 0.01, the robustness parameter to ǫrob ≤ 10
−2 and the
security parameter to ǫ = 10−20. Dashed lines correspond to
the respective asymptotic expected secret key rates. Refer to
the Supplementary Material for a detailed derivation of the
value of the expected secret key rate.
This secret key size should be compared to the asymp-
totic secret key rate assuming collective, Gaussian at-
tacks. This can be done by assuming a passive quantum
channel corresponding to a Gaussian channel with trans-
mittance T and excess noise ξ. One needs to factor in the
robustness of the protocol, that is the probability that the
PE test will not pass in the case of a passive channel. We
plot the secret key rate as a function of n for ǫ = 10−20
on Fig. 2. The asymptotic key rate is typically reached
for n between 108 and 1011 for distances up to 50 km.
Parameter Estimation.— We defer the detailed de-
scription of the protocol E0 and its full security proof
to the appendix and focus more specifically on the PE
step here. A novelty of the protocol is that PE is per-
formed after EC. This can be done quite efficiently since
a rough estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
data is in general sufficient to choose an appropriate er-
ror correcting code and proceed with the reconciliation.
At the end of the EC step, Alice therefore knows the
strings X and U and it is not hard to show that if Bob
sends her a few additional bits, she can learn the values
of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉 arbitrarily well.
The goal of the PE step is to obtain a confidence re-
gion for the covariance matrix of the state ρ
⊗(2n)
AB . Here,
one needs to be careful because by the time PE is per-
formed, the state has already been measured and it does
not make real sense to talk about its covariance matrix
anymore. We will follow the paradigm for tomography
introduced in Ref. [28] and define a quantum tomogra-
phy process as a CPTP map that takes an input state
ρn+k ∈ H⊗(n+k), symmetrizes it and outputs a state
ρn ∈ H⊗n as well as a confidence region R of P=(H⊗n),
the set of normalized density operators on H⊗n. The su-
perscript n for ρn should not be interpreted as saying that
the state has an i.i.d. structure, nor that ρn corresponds
to a marginal state of ρn+k; it is merely a remainder of
the size of Hilbert space it lives in. In words, it consists
in measuring a subsystem of the initial state and making
a prediction for the remaining state. The quality of the
quantum tomography is assessed by two parameters: the
probability that the prediction is false and the size of the
region. A larger region means a smaller error probability,
but also a more pessimistic secret key rate.
An important issue concerning the tomography of a
CV system is that the covariance matrix is a priori un-
bounded. Consider for instance the state σ⊗(n+k) with
σ = (1 − ǫ)|0〉〈0| + ǫ|N〉〈N |. The covariance matrix of
σ is diag(1 +Nǫ/2, 1+Nǫ/2) but any tomographic pro-
cedure that only examines k ≪ 1/ǫ modes will conclude
that the covariance matrix is close to that of the vacuum,
which is clearly incorrect if Nǫ≫ 1. The solution to this
problem consists in first appropriately symmetrizing the
state ρn+k before measuring k subsystems and inferring
properties for the remaining n modes.
Ideally, the tomography of the input state ρ2nAB of the
QKD protocol E0 should consist of the following steps,
which involve additional parties A1 and A2 on Alice’s
side and B1 and B2 on Bob’s side:
1. State symmetrization: Alice’s 2n modes are pro-
cessed with a random network of beamsplitters and
phase-shifts, and Bob’s modes with the conjugate
network, giving a new state ρ˜2n.
2. Distribution to additional players: Alice and Bob
distribute ρ˜n1 corresponding to the first n modes of
ρ˜2n to A1 and B1. Similarly, they give ρ˜
n
2 to A2
and B2.
3. Measurement: A1 and B1 measure ρ˜
n
1 with het-
erodyne detection and obtain two vectors X1, Y1 ∈
R
2n. Similarly, A2 and B2 obtain X2, Y2 ∈ R2n.
4. Parameter Estimation: B1 sends some informa-
tion to A1 so that she can learn the values of
‖X1‖2, ‖Y1‖2 and 〈X1, Y1〉 and then compute a con-
fidence region for the (averaged) covariance matrix
of ρ˜n2 . Similarly, A2 computes a confidence region
for that of ρ˜n1 .
By averaged covariance matrix, we mean
the three real values Σa,Σb,Σc defined by:
Σa/b :=
1
2n
∑n
i=1
(
〈q2A/Bi〉+ 〈p2A/B,i〉
)
and
Σc :=
1
2n
∑n
i=1 (〈qA,iqB,i〉 − 〈pA,ipB,i〉) where qA,i
is the quadrature operator 1√
2
(aˆi + aˆ
†
i ) for the i
th mode
of Alice for instance.
4An interesting feature of this PE procedure is that A1
and A2 can respectively estimate the covariance matrices
of ρ˜n2 and ρ˜
n
1 , meaning that a secret key can be distilled
from both halves of the state. In other words, no raw key
is wasted because of parameter estimation. While it is
clear that this scheme is rather impractical, one can show
that it can nevertheless be efficiently simulated by Alice,
without any need for symmetrization or for additional
parties.
In fact, if Alice learns the values of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and
〈X,Y 〉, she can compute γa, γb, γc as follows
γa :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖X‖2 − 1, (3)
γb :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1 (4)
γc :=
1
2n
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
√
log(8/ǫPE)
n3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2). (5)
We are now in a position to define the Parameter Esti-
mation Test and bound its failure probability (proven in
the appendix).
Theorem 2. The probability that the Parameter Estima-
tion Test passes, that is, [γa ≤ Σmaxa ]∧[γb ≤ Σmaxb ]∧[γc ≥
Σminc ] and that Eve’s information χ(U ;E) computed for
the Gaussian state with covariance matrix character-
ized by Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b and Σ
min
c is underestimated is upper-
bounded by ǫPE.
Here the Holevo information χ(U ;E) is upper bounded
by f(Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c ) := g[(ν1− 1)/2]+ g[(ν2− 1)/2]−
g[(ν3 − 1)/2] where ν1 and ν2 are the symplectic eigen-
values of the covariance matrix
[
Σmaxa 12 Σ
min
c σz
Σminc σz Σ
max
b 12
]
, ν3 =
Σmaxa −
(
Σminc
)2
/(1+Σmaxb ), σz = diag(1,−1) and g(x) :=
(x+ 1) log2(x + 1)− x log2(x).
Once we are able to analyze the PE test, the rest of the
security proof follows in a rather straightforward fashion:
see the appendix for all the details. It should be noted
that the assumption of collective attacks was not used in
the PE step: this is because the symmetrization breaks
the tensor product of the state. However, we crucially
rely on the collective attack assumption when exploiting
the Asymptotic Equipartition Property of the smooth
min-entropy, which is the quantity of interest to analyze
the success of the privacy amplification step.
A security proof against general attacks.— So
far, we have restricted the analysis to collective attacks.
For CV QKD, there are two known techniques to obtain a
full security proof from one holding against collective at-
tacks: an exponential version of de Finetti theorem [16]
and the Postselection technique [17]. The former tech-
nique directly applies here and can be used to upgrade
the protocol E0 to a slightly more complicated one (in-
cluding an energy test and a random permutation) that is
provably ǫ˜-secure against general attacks, but with ǫ˜≫ ǫ,
provided the key length is adequately shortened. How-
ever, while this provides composable security CV QKD
with coherent states against general attacks, it does not
give very good finite-key estimates. The Postselection
technique is better, but still falls short on providing use-
ful finite-size key estimates. Indeed, in order to apply
it, one needs to add an energy test which depends on a
small parameter ǫtest, and if the protocol E0 was ǫ-secure
against collective attacks, the new protocol is ǫ˜-secure
against general attacks where ǫ˜ = ǫ2O(log
4(n/ǫtest))+2ǫtest,
which is prohibitive in practice. Moreover, in the case of
reverse reconciliation, it seems that the current Postse-
lection technique requires an additional symmetrization
step for the classical data, which has complexity Θ(n2).
Whether or not this symmetrization can be simulated, as
was the case in the PE step, is left as an interesting open
question.
Conclusion.— We have provided a composable secu-
rity proof of a CV QKD protocol using coherent states
valid against collective attacks. This was the missing
step to establish the security of such protocols against
general attacks in the composable security framework.
The bounds we obtained are compatible with state-of-
the-art experiments. For protocols with direct recon-
ciliation, this directly gives a composable security proof
against general attacks. For reverse reconciliation, which
is required to achieve long distances, an additional sym-
metrization step provides the same level of security. Fur-
ther work will be needed to improve the current reduc-
tions from general to collective attacks, which should be
possible since the current techniques do not exploit all
the symmetries of the protocols.
We expect our parameter estimation procedure to find
applications in the field of continuous-variable entangle-
ment. Indeed, most criteria for detecting CV entangle-
ment are based on the covariance matrix [29] and to
our knowledge, our procedure gives the first robust es-
timation of the covariance matrix of an unknown quan-
tum state without relying on any assumption such as the
Gaussian nature of the state.
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6In this appendix, we first recall the basic definitions related to the composable security of QKD (Section A). Then,
in Section B, we give a complete description of the QKD protocol E0 that is secure against collective attacks. In
Section C, we explain in details how to compute the expected secret key rate. In Section D, we introduce the tools
needed for the security proof. In Section E, we explain the ideas behind the Parameter Estimation procedure and
establish an upper bound for the failure probability of the PE test. We present the security proof in Section F. Finally,
in Section G, we explain how to upgrade E0 to a protocol provably secure against general attacks.
Appendix A: Quantum Key Distribution and Composable Security
An Entanglement-Based (EB) QKD protocol E is a Completely-Positive Trace-Preserving (CPTP) map:
E : HA ⊗HB → SA ⊗ SB ⊗ C
ρAB 7→ ρSA,SB,C . (A1)
Let us explain the notations. The Hilbert spaces HA and HB refer to the state spaces of Alice and Bob, respectively.
Typically, each of these spaces corresponds to a large number of copies of a small Hilbert space. For instance, in the
case of the BB84 protocol, one has HA ∼= HB ∼= (C2)⊗n, where n is a large number counting how many 2-qubit states
are shared by Alice and Bob. For a Hilbert space H, we denote by P(H) the set of positive semi-definite operators
on H and by P=(H) the set of operators in P(H) with unit trace. Technically, the QKD protocol is therefore defined
for the space P=(HA ⊗HB), but it is sufficient to define it for HA ⊗HB and to extend it by linearity. In the case of
a continuous-variable protocol, H corresponds to an n-mode Fock space: H ∼= F⊗n where F = Span(|0〉, . . . , |k〉, . . .)
and |k〉 is a k-photon Fock state. The fact that this space is infinite-dimensional makes the analysis much more
involved than for BB84, already for the case of collective attacks where the relevant space is F ⊗ F in a CV protocol
(i.e. it is sufficient to consider a single copy of the state and HA ⊗ HB is simply F ⊗ F ), compared to the 2-qubit
space C2 ⊗C2 for BB84.
The spaces SA, SB, C correspond to classical registers (with subscripts A and B referring to Alice and Bob,
respectively). Indeed a QKD protocol takes a quantum state as its input and outputs classical strings. (An exception
is device-independent QKD where the inputs are also classical but then, the violation of a Bell inequality ensures
that Alice and Bob are indeed measuring an entangled quantum system.) The spaces S are that of the final keys and
C is the public transcript of the protocol, corresponding to the classical information exchanged on the authenticated
classical channel and therefore accessible by Eve. For instance, the register C contains the size l of the final key, which
can be zero if the protocol aborted.
A QKD protocol should be secure, which means that it should display both properties of secrecy and correctness.
It should also be robust in the sense that it should output nontrivial keys if there is no active attack on the quantum
channel. Here, we follow the definitions of Ref. [7]. These properties correspond to properties of the output state, more
precisely of ρSASBE , which should hold for any input state. (Here, and in the remainder of the text, ρH corresponds
to the marginal of the state ρ restricted to subspace H .) We note the appearance of the register E corresponding
to the Hilbert space HE of the adversary. To formalize it, we imagine that the true input space of the protocol is
HA⊗HB ⊗HE , and that the input state is a pure state (this is without loss of generality). The protocol then acts as
EAB⊗ idE , i.e. it acts trivially on the adversary’ s space. The output space is SA⊗SB⊗TA⊗TB⊗C⊗HE . Denote by
HE′ = C ⊗HE the space accessible to the adversary (corresponding to her own quantum system E and to the totality
of public communication C). We will be interested in the state ρSASBE′ describing the (output) joint state of the keys
of Alice and Bob and of the adversary. More precisely, a QKD protocol is called correct if SA = SB for any strategy
of the adversary, that is, any initial state of the protocol ΨABE . A protocol is ǫcor-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor. A
key is called δ-secret if it is δ-close to a uniformly distributed key that is uncorrelated with the eavesdropper:
1
2
∥∥∥ρSl
A
E′ − ωl ⊗ ρE′
∥∥∥
1
≤ δ, (A2)
where ρlSA is the state conditioned on the key length being l and ωl is the fully mixed state on classical strings of length
l. We immediately note that if the protocol aborts, the corresponding key, is automatically secret since one party
aborting the protocol immediately informs the other party about this decision. A QKD protocol is called ǫsec-secret
if it outputs δ-secret keys with (1 − pabort)δ ≤ ǫsec. Here, pabort represents the probability that the protocol aborts.
This probability depends on the strategy of the adversary, that is on the input state ΨABE. Indeed, the adversary
can always choose to cut the line between Alice and Bob and hence make sure that the protocol always aborts. This
is fine since the key will nevertheless be secure. An important parameter is the robustness, ǫrob, of the protocol, which
corresponds to the abort probability if the adversary is passive, and if the characteristics of the quantum channel
are conform to what was expected. For instance, in the case of a CV QKD protocol, a typical quantum channel
7corresponding to an optical fiber will be a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance T and excess noise ξ. A QKD
protocol is ǫ-secure if it is ǫsec-secret and ǫcor-correct with ǫsec + ǫcor ≤ ǫ.
A generic technique to prove that a protocol is ǫ-secure is to show that it is indistinguishable from an ideal protocol.
Here, indistinguishability refers to two CPTP maps, and is quantified by the diamond distance between these maps,
with the operational property that the maximum probability of correctly guessing whether a map corresponds to E
or F is given by p = 12 + 14‖E − F‖⋄. Here the map E will be the QKD protocol and F should be an ideal version
of the same QKD protocol. This ideal version is for instance obtained by concatenating E and a (virtual) protocol P
that replaces the final keys SA and SB by a perfect key S: P(ρlSASBE′) = ωl,l ⊗ ρE′ , where ωl,l is the totally mixed
state on two copies of strings of length l. One defines F = P ◦ E and the protocol E is ǫ-secure if
1
2
‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ǫ. (A3)
We note that for (finite-dimensional) symmetric protocols, i.e. such that E◦π = E for any operation π that permutes
simultaneously Alice’s and Bob’s n quantum subsystems, this diamond distance can be bounded by computing the
distance when applied to an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state. This is the idea behind the
Postselection technique [6], which shows that for such protocols, collective attacks are asymptotically optimal. A
crucial question, however, is that of verifying that a protocol displays the required symmetry. This is the case for
protocols such as BB84 with strict one-way classical communication (in fact, the protocol is first restricted to one
where Alice prepares the initial entangled state, which cannot be given by the adversary), but in general, it might
be necessary to actively symmetrize the state (or at least the raw keys) in order to make the protocol symmetric.
We will come back to this question later since symmetrization is a costly process that one would like to avoid in a
practical implementation.
All these notions extend to Prepare-and-Measure (PM) protocols in the following way. A PM protocol and an EB
protocol are equivalent if they are indistinguishable from any coalition of observers outside of Alice’s lab, and if Alice
outputs the same key in both cases. The security of a given PM protocol is a consequence of the security of the
equivalent EB protocol.
Note finally that in this paper, we make the assumption that the measurement devices of Alice and Bob are
trusted and behave accordingly to their theoretical model. In the protocol we consider, the measurements correspond
to heterodyne detection. For a single-mode state ρ, the probability density function of measurement outcome is
p(α) = 〈α|ρ|α〉 where |α〉 = e−|α|2/2∑∞k=0 αk√k! |k〉 is a coherent state centered on α ∈ C in phase-space. In particular,
these assumptions imply that Eve cannot tamper with the Local Oscillator used for the detection. To avoid too much
complication, we also assume that Alice’s state preparation and Bob’s detection are ideal, but note that incorporating
(trusted) imperfections to these models (for instance, imperfect quantum detection efficiency) is straightforward using
similar techniques as in Ref. [30] for instance. Moreover, we use the convention that the shot-noise variance is equal
to 1.
Appendix B: Description of the CV QKD protocol
The main part of this manuscript is devoted to the analysis of a specific protocol, denoted by E0, for which we
prove composable security against collective attacks. We focus on the EB version of the protocol here, with reverse
reconciliation. The direct reconciliation version is easily derived by interchanging the roles of Alice and Bob in the
classical post-processing part of the protocol. In order to obtain security against general attacks, one needs to add
another step to the protocol, involving an energy test as well as a potential symmetrization procedure. This will be
described in Section G.
The protocol is characterized by a number of parameters:
• the number 2n of light pulses (coherent states) exchanged during the protocol.
• The size l of the final key if the protocol did not abort.
• The number d of bits on which each measurement result is encoded. For numerical applications, we will use
d = 5. In general, the value of d should be optimized as a function of the specific reconciliation procedure used
in the protocol.
• The size of Bob’s communication to Alice, leakEC, during the error correction procedure: this includes the
syndrome of Bob’s string for an error correcting code that was decided in advance by Alice and Bob, as well
as the size of a small hash that will allow them to check that the error correction succeeded, except with some
small probability ǫcor. Here failure means that the keys of Alice and Bob do not coincide and that the protocol
did not abort.
8• The number of bits nPE that Bob sends to Alice during the Parameter Estimation.
• Some bounds on covariance matrix elements, Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc . The role of the Parameter Estimation procedure
is to make sure that these bounds are sound in the realization of the protocol. Typically, these values are
optimized as a function of the expected characteristics (transmittance and excess noise) of the quantum channel.
• A maximum failure probability of the Parameter Estimation procedure, ǫPE.
A sketch of the protocol E0 is displayed on Fig. 3.
1. State Preparation: Alice and Bob each have access to a 2n-mode state. The global state is denoted by ρ2nAB .
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob measure their modes with heterodyne detection. They obtain two strings X,Y ∈
R
4n. Bob discretizes his 4n-vector Y in order to obtain the m-bit string U , where m = 4dn, i.e. each symbol is
encoded with d bits of precision.
3. Error Correction: Bob sends some side information to Alice (syndrome of U for a linear error correcting code C
agreed on in advance) and Alice outputs a guess UA for the string of Bob. Bob computes a hash of U of length
⌈log(1/ǫcor)⌉ and sends it to Alice who compares it with her own hash. If both hashes coincide, the protocol resumes,
otherwise it aborts. The value leakEC corresponds to the total number of bits sent by Bob during the error correction
phase.
4. Parameter Estimation: Bob sends nPE bits of information to Alice that allow her to obtain three values γa, γb
and γc defined in Eq. B24, B25 and B26. If γa ≤ Σ
max
a and γb ≤ Σ
max
b and γc ≥ Σ
min
c , then the protocol continues.
Otherwise it aborts.
5. Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply a random universal2 hash function to their respective strings,
obtaining two strings SA and SB of size l.
Figure 3: Protocol E0, with reverse reconciliation and parameters n, l, d, leakEC, ǫcor, nPE, ǫPE,Σ
max
a ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c .
We also recall our main result:
Theorem 3. The protocol E0 is ǫ-secure against collective attacks if ǫ = 2ǫsm + ǫ¯+ ǫPE/ǫ+ ǫcor/ǫ+ ǫent/ǫ and
l ≤2n
[
2HˆMLE(U)− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )
]
− leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2ǫ¯
, (B1)
where HˆMLE(U) is the empirical entropy of U , ∆AEP :=
√
2n
[
(d+ 1)2 + 4(d+ 1) log2
2
ǫ2sm
+ 2 log2
2
ǫ2ǫsm
]
− 4 ǫsmdǫ ,
∆ent := log2
1
ǫ −
√
8n log22(4n) log(2/ǫ) and f is the function computing the Holevo information between Eve and
Bob’s measurement result for a Gaussian state with covariance matrix parametrized by Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c .
Note that in the main text, we used that ǫ =
√
ǫPE + ǫcor + ǫent + 2ǫsm + ǫ¯ as a possible security parameter.
The function f is defined as follows:
f(x, y, z) := g((ν1 − 1)/2) + g((ν2 − 1)/2)− g((ν3 − 1)/2), (B2)
where ν1 and ν2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
[
x12 zσz
zσz y12
]
, ν3 = x
2 − (z2)2 /(1 + y), σz =
diag(1,−1) and the entropy function g is given by g(x) := (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2(x).
The symplectic eigenvalues ν1 and ν2 of the covariance matrix
[
x12 zσz
zσz y12
]
satisfy the following relations:
ν21 + ν
2
2 = x
2 + y2 − 2z2 (B3)
ν21ν
2
2 = (xy − z2)2. (B4)
More explicitly,
ν1 =
√
1
2
(
x2 + y2 − 2z2 +
√
(x2 + y2 − 2z2)− 2− 4(xy − z2)2
)
(B5)
ν2 =
√
1
2
(
x2 + y2 − 2z2 −
√
(x2 + y2 − 2z2)− 2− 4(xy − z2)2
)
. (B6)
9The empirical entropy of U is computed as follows. The random variable U is discrete and takes values in a set
of size 2d (where d is the discretization parameter). Let us denote by nˆi the number of times the variable U takes
the value i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2d}, and let us denote by pˆi = nˆi4n the relative frequency of obtaining the value i. Note
that there are 4n samples in total, since 2n states are measured, and each measurement gives two outcomes, one per
quadrature. We define the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE), also know as “empirical entropy", for H(U) to be
HˆMLE(U) := −
2d∑
i=1
pˆi log pˆi. (B7)
Finally, the leakage term leakEC is simply the size of the syndrome transmitted by Bob to Alice during the error
correction step.
We now detail the various steps of the protocol.
1. State Preparation
Alice prepares 2n copies of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, |Φ〉⊗2n where |Φ〉 =
[
2
V+1
]1/4∑∞
k=0
[
V−1
V+1
]k/2
|k, k〉.
The squeezing parameter of the state is optimized as a function of the expected characteristics of the quantum channel.
The covariance matrix of the two-mode squeezed vacuum state (with the ordering convention qˆA, pˆA, qˆB, pˆB where
qˆA/B and pˆA/B are the quadrature operators for Alice and Bob, respectively) is given by
ΓTMSS =
[
V 12
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V 12
]
, (B8)
where 12 = diag(1, 1) and σz = diag(1,−1). Alice keeps the first mode of each state |Φ〉 and sends the second half
to Bob through an insecure quantum channel. When proving security, we will not make any assumption about the
quantum channel, which can be arbitrary. When considering the robustness of the protocol, however, it makes sense
to model the channel as one that typically occurs in implementations. Our model of choice is a Gaussian channel
with fixed transmittance T and excess noise ξ. In this specific case, the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is
Gaussian and its covariance matrix reads:
ΓGauss =
[
V 12
√
T
√
V 2 − 1σz√
T
√
V 2 − 1σz (TV − T + 1 + Tξ)12
]
. (B9)
2. Measurement
a. Obtaining two real-valued vectors
In the Entanglement-Based version of the protocol, the measurement phase is straightforward. Alice and Bob
both have access to 2n modes, which they measure with a heterodyne detection. We denote by qˆ and pˆ the two
quadratures for each mode. Alice and Bob then form two vectors of length 4n where odd index coordinates refer
to quadrature measurement qˆ and even index coordinates refer to quadrature pˆ. We denote these two vectors by
Xexp = (Xexp1 , . . . , X
exp
4n ) for Alice and Y
exp = (Y exp1 , . . . , Y
exp
4n ) for Bob. The superscript exp refers to experimental
data.
Conditioned on her measurement outcomes Xexp, Alice has effectively prepared 2n coherent states for Bob (before
the quantum channel), {|XPM2k+1 + iXPM2k+2〉}k=1···2n where the vector XPM is related to Xexp through
XPMk :=


√
V−1
V+1X
exp
k if k is odd,
−
√
V−1
V+1X
exp
k if k is even.
(B10)
Here V corresponds to the variance of the initial two-mode squeezed vacuum states prepared by Alice.
The equivalence between the Entangled-Based and the Prepare-and-Measure versions of the protocol is seen from
the fact that Alice’s vectors in both cases are related through Eq. B10. We recall that in the Prepare-and-Measure
version, Alice would simply prepare the 2n coherent states {|XPM2k+1 + iXPM2k+2〉}k=1···2n and send them to Bob, where
the random variables XPMk are i.i.d. centered Gaussian variables with variance (V − 1).
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b. Centering the measurement outcomes
In the QKD protocols investigated in this paper, Alice and Bob will measure a quantum state with a heterodyne
detection and obtain continuous-valued outcomes Xexp1 , . . . , X
exp
4n and Y
exp
1 , . . . , Y
exp
4n (where the components with an
odd index correspond to measurement outcomes for the qˆ quadrature and components with an even index correspond
to pˆ quadrature measurements), and where the superscript exp refers to the fact that the variables correspond to the
effectively measured experimental data.
The security of the key that can be extracted from a given state with the protocols described here does not depend
on the first moment of the quantum state: only its covariance matrix matters [20, 21]. For that reason, Alice and Bob
can apply a displacement to their state before measuring it or alternatively simulate this displacement at the level of
classical data. For reasons that will appear more clearly later (related to the symmetrization procedure needed for
Parameter Estimation for instance), it is better for the quantum state to be centered. To do that, Alice and Bob can
compute two values for the displacement:
DAq :=
1
2n
2n−1∑
k=0
Xexp2k+1, D
A
p :=
1
2n
2n∑
k=1
Xexp2k , D
B
q :=
1
2n
2n−1∑
k=0
Y exp2k+1 and D
B
p :=
1
2n
2n∑
k=1
Y exp2k (B11)
and define the new variables
Xk :=
{
Xexpk −DAq if k is odd,
Xexpk −DAp if k is even,
(B12)
Yk :=
{
Y expk −DBq if k is odd,
Y expk −DBp if k is even,
(B13)
and use these variables in the remainder of the QKD protocol. The resulting random variablesXk and Yk are therefore
centered. One advantage of working with centered variables is that the covariance matrix elements can be simply
expressed in terms the expectations of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉.
c. Discretization of a continuous variable
In this work, we only consider discretization of continuous variables, one at a time. More precisely, we will divide
the real axis into 2d intervals. Here, the choice of a power of 2 is only made for convenience. This partition should be
chosen so as to maximize the secret key rate in the case where the adversary is passive, when the quantum channel
acts as a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance and excess noise. In that case, Bob’s outcomes are centered
Gaussian random variables. Bob can easily compute the average variance of his measurement outcomes, 14n‖Y ‖2.
Consider the 2d quantiles I1, . . . , I2d of the normal distribution N (0, 14n‖Y ‖2). We will apply the discretization mapD : Y 7→ U that assigns a distinct value for each quantile: D(Yk) = j if Yk ∈ Ij .
We note that if the quantum channel is indeed Gaussian, then the random variable U = D(Y ) should be close to
uniform, i.e. have almost maximum entropy. In fact, this discretization is suboptimal because it does not maximize
the mutual information between Alice and Bob, I(X ;U). This will lead to a slightly suboptimal secret key rate, but
with the advantage of a simpler security analysis. Better schemes involving a multidimensional error correction have
been investigated in the literature [31] and could probably be proven secure against general attacks.
At the end of this step, Alice knows the vectorX ∈ R4n and Bob knows both vectors Y ∈ R4n and U ∈ {1, . . . , 2d}4n.
3. Error correction
The goal of this step is for Alice to learn the string U . In order to help her calibrate her data, Bob first sends
her the value of ‖Y ‖2 which is used for the discretization function D. This can be done by sending the value of√‖Y ‖2/(4n) with a few bits of precision. A possible technique to perform error correction is called slice reconciliation
[27, 32]. This means that Alice and Bob agree (before they start the QKD protocol) on a linear error correcting code
C (or, more precisely, on a family of such codes) that encodes K-bit binary strings into 4dn-bit code words. This code
is described by a parity-check matrix H of size (4dn) × (4dn − K). Bob computes the syndrome HU of his vector
(interpreted as a binary string of length 4dn) and sends this syndrome to Alice. This syndrome accounts for most of
the leakage during the error correction procedure. A figure of merit typically used in CV QKD to assess the quality
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of the error correction is the reconciliation efficiency β defined as:
β =
4dn− leakEC
2n log2(1 + SNR)
, (B14)
where the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is that of the expected Gaussian channel mapping X to Y . The reconciliation
efficiency compares how much information was extracted through the error correction procedure and compares it with
the available mutual information corresponding to a Gaussian quantum channel of transmittance T and excess noise
ξ. In particular, one expects:
SNR =
T (V − 1)
2 + Tξ
. (B15)
In that case, the quantity 12 log2(1 + SNR) is the mutual information for each use of the channel, and gives an upper
bound on the quantity of (classical) information that can be transmitted over the classical channel Xi 7→ Yi. The
reconciliation efficiency therefore quantifies how far the error correction procedure is from an ideal one: if β = 1, then
it is perfect. In practice, one can typically achieve β ≈ 0.95 for a Gaussian channel [27].
Once Alice learns the syndrome HU , she can use it together with her vector X and the value of ‖Y ‖ in order to
recover an estimate Uˆ of U . This is done by decoding the code C in the coset corresponding to the syndrome. There
are very practical algorithms for decoding as soon as the code C is a low-density parity-check code for instance.
After this step, it is necessary to know whether the error correction worked, i.e. whether Uˆ = U or not. To achieve
this, the usual technique is for Alice and Bob to choose a random universal2 hash function mapping 4dn-bit strings
to strings of length ⌈log(1/ǫcor)⌉. Then Bob reveals his hash to Alice. If both hashes coincide, the protocol resumes,
otherwise it aborts. The length of the hash is chosen so the protocol is ǫcor-correct (see Theorem 1 of Ref. [7] for a
proof of this statement).
4. Parameter Estimation
The Parameter Estimation is arguably the most crucial step in a QKD protocol: it is a coarse-grained version
of quantum tomography, the process of inferring the description of a quantum state when one only has access to
measurement outcomes. It is only a coarse-grained version of tomography because the security of the key usually only
depends on a small number of parameters of the underlying quantum state.
Before we describe in detail the Parameter Estimation step of the protocol E0, it is useful to explain a bit more how
one can perform the tomography of continuous-variable quantum systems. Our approach is based on the paradigm
introduced by Christandl and Renner in Ref. [28].
a. Estimation of the covariance matrix of a CV system
One specific aspect of quantum tomography is that it does not make sense to speak of a quantum state if the state
does not exist anymore, because it was already measured, say. For this reason, a quantum tomography process can
be described as a CPTP map as follows:
Tom: H⊗(n+k) → H⊗n ⊗R
ρn+k 7→ ρn ⊗R, (B16)
where R is a classical random variable corresponding to a confidence region for the output state ρn. More precisely,
the random variable R describes a region of P=(H⊗n), the set of normalized density operators on H⊗n, which is
believed to contain the state ρn. Here the superscript n for ρn should not be interpreted as saying that the state has
an i.i.d. structure, nor that ρn corresponds to a marginal state of ρn+k; it is merely a reminder of the size of Hilbert
space it lives in.
The quantum tomography protocol involves performing measurements on a subsystem (here living in H⊗k) of the
initial quantum state and the quality of the protocol is assessed by two parameters: the probability ǫtom that the
prediction is false and the size of the region. Of course, if the region R is equal to the total space, H⊗n, the prediction
is always correct, but it is also uninformative. For a QKD protocol, the size of the region will influence the tightness of
the bound on the secret key rate: smaller confidence regions lead to tighter key rates. But the more crucial parameter
is the probability that the prediction is incorrect. This probability is the smallest value of ǫtom such that:
∀ρn+k ∈ H⊗(n+k),Pr [ρn ∈ R] ≥ 1− ǫtom (B17)
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where ρn and R are the output of the map Tom applied to ρn+k.
In the context of CV QKD, we are interested in estimating the (averaged) covariance matrix of a bipartite state ρ˜nAB
(this state is in fact obtained from ρ2nAB after a suitable symmetrization as we will explain later) which is characterized
by three real values:
Σa :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈q2Ai〉+ 〈p2A,i〉] (B18)
Σb :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈q2Bi〉+ 〈p2B,i〉] (B19)
Σc :=
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[〈qA,iqB,i〉 − 〈pA,ipB,i〉] (B20)
where qA,i is the quadrature operator
1√
2
(aˆi + aˆ
†
i ) for the i
th mode of Alice for instance. For CV QKD, the region R
will be a confidence region for the three parameters Σa,Σb and Σc. There are two reasons for this choice. The first
one is the extremality property of Gaussian states for the Holevo information[19, 20]: this says that this information
can be upper bounded by a function of the covariance matrix of the state. Second, it is sufficient to compute this
bound for the following symmetrized covariance matrix:
Γsym :=
n⊕
i=1


Σa 0 Σc ∗
0 Σa ∗ −Σc
Σc ∗ Σb 0
∗ −Σc 0 Σb

 . (B21)
where the entries ∗ are not specified. More precisely, one can always assume that these entries are 0. This will be
detailed in the section devoted to the security proof. Moreover, because of the properties of the Holevo information,
it will be sufficient for our purpose to obtain a confidence region for (Σa,Σb,Σc) of the form [0,Σ
max
a ] × [0,Σmaxb ] ×
[Σminc ,∞].
Usually the task of quantum tomography is greatly simplified if we only require it to hold for initial states which
are i.i.d., that if of the form ρ⊗(n+k). When it comes to estimating a covariance matrix, however, this assumption
still appears quite weak. The problem comes from the fact that the coefficients of the covariance matrix are a priori
unbounded (this is a fundamental difference with finite-dimensional systems such as qubits, for which the density
matrix elements are obviously bounded). Consider for instance the state σ⊗(n+k) with σ = (1 − ǫ)|0〉〈0| + ǫ|N〉〈N |.
The covariance matrix of σ is diag(1 +Nǫ/2, 1 +Nǫ/2) but any tomographic procedure that only examines k ≪ 1/ǫ
modes will conclude that the covariance matrix is close to that of the vacuum, which is clearly false if Nǫ ≫ 1. In
order to solve this issue, the solution consists in first appropriately symmetrizing the state ρn+k before measuring k
subsystems and inferring properties for the remaining n modes. This will solve the problem of parameter estimation,
but create a new issue, namely that the output state of the tomographic procedure will not have a i.i.d. structure
anymore, making the analysis of collective attacks more complicated.
The symmetrization that makes sense for CV QKD is the one that maximally symmetrizes the state while leaving
the (averaged) values Σa,Σb,Σc of the covariance matrix unchanged. We explain this symmetrization now for an
initial state ρn+k on F
⊗(n+k)
A ⊗ F⊗(n+k)B . Consider the unitary group U(n + k) acting on Cn+k. This group acts in
a natural way on the (n + k)-mode Fock space F⊗(n+k) by associating to V ∈ U(n + k) the unitary operator Φ(V )
acting on F⊗(n+k) which maps the vector ~a = (a1, . . . , an+k) of annihilation operators of the n+k modes to the vector
V~a. This operation corresponds to a passive linear symplectic map in phase space and can be implemented thanks
to a network of beamsplitters and phase-shifts acting on the n+ k modes. The group U(n+ k) also acts naturally on
F
⊗(n+k)
A ⊗ F⊗(n+k)B by associating to V the unitary Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V ∗)B where V ∗ represents the complex conjugate of
V . The symmetrization procedure consists in drawing a random unitary V from the Haar measure dV on U(n + k)
and applying Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V ∗)B to the state:
Sym: P=
(
F
⊗(n+k)
A ⊗ F⊗(n+k)B
)
→ P=
(
F
⊗(n+k)
A ⊗ F⊗(n+k)B
)
ρn+kAB 7→
∫
(Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V ∗)B) ρn+kAB (Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V ∗)B)† dV.
(B22)
The Parameter Estimation procedure that we have in mind first symmetrizes the state with Sym, then measures
the last k modes with heterodyne detection and uses the measurement outcomes to give a confidence region for
Σa,Σb,Σc. In the QKD protocol, we will in fact choose k = n. If Alice and Bob were to proceed with the tomography
procedure explained above, they would therefore measure n modes each with heterodyne detection, and attempt to
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infer a confidence region for the covariance matrix of the n remaining modes. Let us denote by X2 and Y2 the 2n-
vectors corresponding to their measurement results. In order to estimate Σa,Σb,Σc, Alice and Bob need to compute
‖X2‖2, ‖Y2‖2 and 〈X2, Y2〉. Since we study a QKD protocol, it is essential to limit classical communication to a
minimum, because it might help the adversary. Our goal is for Alice to be able to perform the parameter estimation:
it is clear that she can compute ‖X2‖2. Similarly, Bob can compute ‖Y2‖2 locally and simply send the result to Alice
using a few bits to encode its value (as we explained before). Computing the inner product 〈X2, Y2〉 is a bit more
problematic. In fact, computing the inner product of two vectors held by distant parties is a very well-known problem
in communication complexity where the goal is to achieve the task while exchanging as little public information as
possible. In the QKD setting, we are helped because the parameter estimation can be performed after the error
correction. This means in particular that Alice knows X2 as well as Yˆ2, her estimate of Y2. Recall that this is only
an estimate because the error correction procedure only allows her to recover Bob’s discretized vector (with high
probability if the protocol did not abort).
Our goal is to obtain a lower bound on the value of 〈X2, Y2〉, which will translate into a lower bound for Σc.
The discretization procedure maps Y to U . We define another map that attempts to invert the discretization.
Recall that Ii is the ith quantile of the distribution N (0, v) for a specific variance v. One can define 2d values, one
for each quantile, as follows:
yˆi := 2
d
∫
Ii
x√
2πv
e−
x2
2v dx, (B23)
which means that yˆi corresponds to the mean of the Gaussian random variable conditioned on the fact that it is in
the quantile Ii.
Alice knows both X2 and Yˆ2 while Bob knows Y2 and Yˆ2. Since 〈X2, Y2〉 = 〈X2, Yˆ2〉+ 〈X2, Y2 − Yˆ2〉, it is sufficient
for Alice to be able to estimate 〈X2, Y2 − Yˆ2〉, a quantity expected to be very small in practice. In order to achieve
this, Bob first sends the norm of ‖Y2 − Yˆ2‖ to Alice. This requires only a small constant number of bits. Then, the
communication problem that Alice and Bob should solve is the following: Alice knows a 2n-dimensional unit vector
~a = X2‖X2‖ , and Bob knows another unit vector
~b = Y2−Yˆ2‖Y2−Yˆ2‖ , and they wish to estimate 〈~a,~b〉 up to a small additive
error.
This problem is studied in Ref. [33]. The technique described by Kremer, Nisan and Ron gives the value 〈~a,~b〉 with
additive error ǫ2 (except with probability ǫ1) with a k-round protocol with k = Θ(log(1/ǫ1)/ǫ
2
2). This means that
Bob only needs to send approximately log(1/ǫ1)/ǫ
2
2 bits to Alice, so that she can compute 〈X2, Y2〉 arbitrary well.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume for simplicity that this task can be completed perfectly. This is a
legitimate assumption since Yˆ2 only differs from Y2 because of discretization errors which are arbitrarily small. A
thorough analysis of this type of errors and of the related optimization of the discretization step is left for future work.
Note that there are no conceptual difficulties hidden here, but that optimizing this task only makes sense only if it is
done jointly with the error correction procedure.
b. Parameter Estimation in the protocol E0
Now that we have explained the spirit of the Parameter Estimation procedure, we can introduce the PE test. Once
Alice learns the values of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉, she can compute:
γa :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖X‖2 − 1, (B24)
γb :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1, (B25)
γc :=
1
2n
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
√
log(8/ǫPE)
n3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2). (B26)
Then, she compares these values with the parameters Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b and Σ
min
c of the protocol. If the three following
conditions γa ≤ Σmaxa and γb ≤ Σmaxb and γc ≥ σminc , then the protocol continues. Otherwise it aborts. The Parameter
Estimation test is therefore defined as follows:
Parameter Estimation Test:
• Parameters : Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc ,
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• Input : ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2, 〈X,Y 〉,
• Output : “Pass” if [γa ≤ Σmaxa ] ∧ [γb ≤ Σmaxb ] ∧
[
γc ≥ σminc
]
; “Fail” otherwise.
When fixing the parameters of the test, one should always apply a trade-off between the expected secret key rate
and the robustness. Typically, if the variance of Alice’s initial state is V , if the expected transmittance of the quantum
channel is T and the expected excess noise is ξ, one should choose
Σmaxa = V + δa (B27)
Σmaxb = T (V − 1) + 1 + Tξ + δb (B28)
Σminc =
√
T (V − 1)− δc (B29)
where δa, δb and δc are small positive constants which are optimized (as a function of n) to ensure both robustness
and large secret key rate.
In numerical applications, we choose a value of the robustness of about 1 percent, which is obtained for instance
by choosing δa, δb and δc equal to 3 standard deviations for γa, γb and γc (for an expected Gaussian channel with
transmittance T and excess noise ξ).
5. Privacy Amplification
This step is completely standard: Alice chooses a universal2 hash function [34, 35] and extracts l bits of secret SA
from Uˆ . She communicates the choice of function to Bob who uses it to compute SB.
Appendix C: Expected secret key rate
In order to compute the expected secret key rate provided by a security proof, one needs to model the quantum
channel. Here, we will model it as a Gaussian channel with fixed transmissivity T and fixed excess noise ξ.
Our goal in this section is to explain how to reproduce the plot of Fig. 2 in the main text. Recall that the secret
key rate is given by
l ≤2n
[
2HˆMLE(U)− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )
]
− leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2ǫ¯
, (C1)
with ǫ = 2ǫsm + ǫ¯+ ǫPE/ǫ+ ǫcor/ǫ+ ǫent/ǫ.
For concreteness, we wish to compute a secret key rate with ǫ = 10−20. In general, one should optimize over all the
values of the parameters compatible with such an ǫ, but here, we make the following (slightly suboptimal) choice:
ǫsm = ǫ¯ = 10
−21, ǫPE = ǫcor = ǫent = 10−41. (C2)
Moreover, we use the following model for the error correction:
βI(A;B) = 2HˆMLE(U)− 1
2n
leakEC (C3)
where β is the so-called “reconciliation efficiency" and I(A;B) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob’s
classical data. Efficient error correction protocols are known for reconciling correlated Gaussian random variables and
e choose β = 0.95 which is consistent with the best schemes available in the literature.
For the Gaussian channel we consider, and if the variance modulation is V , we obtain:
I(A;B) = 2× 1
2
log2(1 + SNR) (C4)
= log2
(
1 +
T (V − 1)
2/T ξ
)
. (C5)
Moreover, we choose the robustness of the protocol to be ǫrob ≤ 10−2, which is obtained if the probability of passing
the Parameter Estimation test is at least 0.99. This can be achieved by taking values for Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b ,Σ
min
c differing
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by 3 standard deviations from the expected values of γa, γb, γc. With probability at least 0.99, the values of random
variables ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2, 〈X,Y 〉 satisfy the following inequalities:
‖X‖2 ≤ 2n(V + 1) + 3
√
4n(V + 1) (C6)
‖Y ‖2 ≤ 2n(T (V − 1) + Tξ + 2) + 3
√
4n(T (V − 1) + Tξ + 2) (C7)
〈X,Y 〉 ≥ 2n
√
T (V 2 − 1)− 3
√
n(V − 1)(2 + Tξ) (C8)
where we modeled each (xi, yi) as identical and independent normal random variables, centered and with covariance
matrix
[
V+1
√
T (V 2−1)√
T (V 2−1) T (V−1)+Tξ+2
]
. Finally, we use these bounds on ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2, 〈X,Y 〉 to define:
Σmaxa =
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖X‖2 − 1 (C9)
Σmaxb =
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1 (C10)
Σminc =
1
2n
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
√
log(8/ǫPE)
n3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2). (C11)
With all this, we are now in a position to compute the expected secret key rate displayed on Fig. 2 of the main
text:
r = (1− ǫrob) l
2n
(C12)
= (1− ǫrob)
(
β log2
(
1 +
T (V − 1)
2/T ξ
)
− f(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )−
1
2n
[
∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2ǫ¯
])
. (C13)
The last step is to optimize over values of the modulation variance V .
Appendix D: Tools for proving the security of the protocol E0 against collective attacks
In this section, we describe the various elementary tools that will be used in the security proof. First, the leftover
hash lemma relates the secrecy of the protocol with the smooth min-entropy of the raw key U , conditioned on the
adversary’s system. Then, when the analysis is restricted to collective attacks, the Asymptotic Equipartition Property
allows one to compute this smooth min-entropy as a function of the von Neumann entropy of a single subsystem.
There are two problems remaining then: computing the entropy of the string U and estimating the average covariance
matrix of the quantum system. The first question is addressed thanks to a concentration result for the entropy of an
i.i.d. random variable, the second is taken care of with the analysis of the parameter estimation test.
1. Leftover Hash Lemma
One wishes to prove a statement about the secrecy of a given QKD protocol, i.e. that 12
∥∥∥ρSl
A
E′ − ωl ⊗ ρE′
∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫsec.
In other words, the variable SA should be decoupled from the system E
′ characterizing what is available to the
adversary, namely her own Hilbert space HE as well as the public information, C, leaked during the QKD protocol.
Such a bound can be established via the Leftover Hash Lemma [36, 37], which holds if SA is obtained by applying
a random universal2 hash function of length l to the string U , where l should be slightly smaller than the smooth
min-entropy of U conditioned on E′. The smooth min-entropy, Hǫmin(U |E), introduced in Ref. [36], characterizes the
average probability that Eve guesses U correctly using her optimal strategy with access to the correlations stored in
her quantum memory [38]. For a precise mathematical definition, we refer the reader to Ref. [39].
More precisely, the Privacy Amplification procedure applied to the string U outputs a the key of size l which is
ǫsec-secret provided that [7, 37, 40]
ǫsec = min
ǫ′
1
2
√
2l−Hǫ
′
min
(U|E′) + 2ǫ′, (D1)
where E′ summarizes all the information Eve learned about U during the protocol.
16
2. Smooth min-entropy of a conditional state
Evaluating the smooth min-entropy is usually a intractable optimization problem. Fortunately, in many interesting
situations (such as the study of collective attacks), it is sufficient to evaluate it for i.i.d. states, in which case the
Asymptotic Equipartition Property applies, and provides a bound expressed in terms of the von Neumann entropy.
In the case of CV QKD, one needs to compute the smooth min-entropy of the state provided the protocol did not
abort. Unfortunately, this postselection destroys the i.i.d. structure of the initial state, and the AEP does not directly
apply anymore. In the following, we show that we can still obtain a weak version of the AEP for the postselected
state and relate the smooth min-entropy to the von Neumann entropy.
In particular, we show the following result.
Theorem 4 (AEP for conditional state). Let ρXB be a classical quantum state, and denote by d = log2 dimHX so
that the variable X has cardinality 2d. Let τXnBn =
1
pΠ(ρXB)
⊗nΠ with p = tr (Π(ρXB)⊗n) and Π be any projector
such that τXnBn and ρ
⊗n
XB commute. Then,
Hǫmin(X
n|Bn)τXnBn ≥ H(Xn|Bn)τXnBn −
√
n
[
(d+ 1)2 + 4(d+ 1) log2
2
ǫ2
+ 2 log2
2
p2ǫ
]
− 4 ǫd
p
. (D2)
The proof uses many results from Chapter 6 of Tomamichel’s thesis [41], and is partially based on discussions with
Marco Tomamichel.
Proof. Let us fix α = 1 + 1√
n
. Prop 6.2 from [41] gives:
Hǫmin(X
n|Bn)τ ≥ Hα(Xn|Bn)τ −
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
. (D3)
We now bound this quantity in terms of the α-Rényi entropy computed for the i.i.d. state ρ⊗n:
Hα(X
n|Bn)τ = max
σnB
1
1− α log2 tr (τ
α
XnBnσ
1−α
Bn ) (D4)
= max
σn
B
1
1− α log2 tr ((Π(ρXB)
⊗nΠ)ασ1−αBn )−
α
1− α log2
1
p
(D5)
≥ max
σn
B
1
1− α log2 tr ((ρXB)
⊗n)ασ1−αBn )−
α
1− α log2
1
p
(D6)
= Hα(X
n|Bn)ρ⊗n − α
1− α log2
1
p
(D7)
= nHα(X |B)ρ − 2
√
n log2
1
p
. (D8)
Lemma 6.3 from [41] then yields:
Hα(X |B)ρ ≥ H(X |B)ρ − 4√
n
(log2 ν)
2 (D9)
where ν :=
√
2−Hmin(X|B)ρ +
√
2Hmax(X|B)ρ + 1 ≤ 2d/2 + 2 ≤ 2(d+1)/2 − 1/4, for d ≥ 3. So far, we have established
that:
Hǫmin(X
n|Bn)τ ≥ H(Xn|Bn)ρ⊗n −
√
n
[
(d+ 1)2 + 2 log2
1
pǫ
]
. (D10)
Intuitively, both conditional entropies H(Xn|Bn)τ and H(Xn|Bn)ρ⊗n should be close, provided p is not too small.
Let us make this rigorous.
Consider a purification ρXBE of ρXB. Clearly, τXnBnEn =
1
p (Π⊗1E)ρ⊗nXBE(Π⊗1E) is also a purification of τXnBn .
Consequently, the followings identities hold: H(X |B)ρ = −H(X |E)ρ and H(Xn|Bn)τ = −H(Xn|En)τ .
The Asymptotic Equipartition Property (Corollary 6.5 from [41]) applied to ρ⊗n gives
Hǫmin(X
n|En)ρ⊗n ≥ H(Xn|En)ρ⊗n − 2(d+ 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
. (D11)
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Define λ such that − log2 λ = H(Xn|En)ρ⊗n − 2(d + 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2 . By definition of the smooth min-entropy, there
exists an operator ρ¯XnEn with the following properties:
λ · (1X ⊗ ρE)⊗n − ρ¯XnEn ≥ 0. (D12)
‖ρ⊗nXE − ρ¯XnEn‖1 ≤ ǫ. (D13)
Define also the operator τ¯XnBnEn :=
1
pΠρ¯XnBnEnΠ. Since Π ≤ 1XBE , the following inequalities hold:
‖τXnEn − τ¯XnEn‖1 ≤ ǫ
p
and τ¯XnEn ≤ 1
p
ρ¯XnEn ≤ 1
p
λ · (idX ⊗ ρE)⊗n. (D14)
By definition of the conditional von Neumann entropy,
H(Xn|En)τ¯XnEn := max
σn
E
tr
[
τ¯XnEn
(
1X ⊗ log2 σ⊗nE − log2 τ¯XnEn
)]
(D15)
≥ tr [τ¯XnEn (1X ⊗ log2 ρ⊗nE − log2 τ¯XnEn)] (D16)
≥ tr
[
τ¯XnEn
(
1X ⊗ log2 ρ⊗nE − log2(1X ⊗ ρE)⊗n − log2 λ− log2
1
p
)]
(D17)
≥ tr
[
τ¯XnEn
(
− log2 λ− log2
1
p
)]
(D18)
≥ tr [τ¯XnEn ]
[
H(Xn|En)ρ⊗n − 2(d+ 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
− log2
1
p
]
(D19)
≥
(
1− ǫ
p
)
H(Xn|En)ρ⊗n − 4(d+ 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
− 2 log2
1
p
. (D20)
The duality property of the conditional von Neumann entropy implies that:
H(Xn|Bn)ρ⊗n ≥
(
1− ǫ
p
)
H(Xn|En)ρ⊗n ≥ H(Xn|Bn)τ¯XnBn − 4(d+ 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
− 2 log2
1
p
. (D21)
The Alicky-Fannes inequality applied to τ and τ¯ gives:
H(Xn|Bn)τ¯XnBn ≥ H(X |B)τXnBn − 4
ǫd
p
− 2h(ǫ/p). (D22)
Finally, noticing that the binary entropy h(ǫ/p) is less than 1 yields:
H(Xn|Bn)ρ⊗n ≥ H(Xn|Bn)τXnBn − 4(d+ 1)
√
n log2
2
ǫ2
− 2 log2
2
p
− 4 ǫd
p
. (D23)
Combining this bound with Eq. D10 completes the proof.
If p ≥ ǫ, we obtain the bound:
Hǫsmmin(X
2n|E2n)τX2nE2n ≥ H(X2n|E2n)τX2nE2n −∆AEP , (D24)
with
∆AEP :=
√
2n
[
(d+ 1)2 + 4(d+ 1) log2
2
ǫ2sm
+ 2 log2
2
ǫ2ǫsm
]
+ 4
ǫsmd
ǫ
. (D25)
3. Lower bound on the entropy of an i.i.d. variable
Let U be a random variable with finite support {u1, . . . , u2d} described by an unknown probability distribution
pi = Pr[U = ui]. Given that we observe n independent realizations of this random variable, U = (U1, . . . , Un), we
wish to obtain a lower bound on its entropy H(U) = −∑2di=1 pi log pi. We define the Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(MLE), also know as “empirical entropy", for H(U) to be
HˆMLE(U) := −
2d∑
i=1
pˆi log pˆi, (D26)
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where pˆi =
1
n
∑n
k=1 δi(Uk) and δi denotes the probability measure concentrated at ui. The random variable HˆMLE(U)
is negatively biased everywhere [42]:
EpHˆMLE(U) ≤ H(U), (D27)
where Ep denotes the conditional expectation given p. This gives a lower bound on H(U) but one that is not directly
observable in an experiment. The missing piece is a concentration result for HˆMLE(U) around its mean due to Antos
and Kontoyiannis [43].
Theorem 5 (Antos and Kontoyiannis).
Pr
[∣∣∣HˆMLE(U)−EHˆMLE∣∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ ǫ, (D28)
where
δ =
√
2 log22 n log(2/ǫ)
n
.
Since HˆMLE(U) is directly measurable in an experiment, we obtain a lower bound on the entropy of the distribution,
when we are given access to n i.i.d. realizations:
Pr

H(U) ≤ HˆMLE(U)−
√
2 log22 n log(2/ǫ)
n

 ≤ ǫ. (D29)
Finally, we consider the random variable V with support {u1, . . . , u2d}n and probability distribution
Pr[V = ui1 . . . uin ] =
{ pi1 ···pin
pA
if ui1 . . . uin ∈ A,
0 otherwise.
(D30)
where pA := Pr[U
n ∈ A] is the probability that the string Un belongs to the set A. It immediately follows from
Eq. D29 that:
Pr

H(V ) ≤ HˆMLE(V )− log2 1pA −
√
2 log22 n log(2/ǫ)
n

 ≤ ǫ
pA
. (D31)
In the QKD protocol, the probability pA of passing can be assumed to be at least equal to the security parameter
ǫ. We obtain that the following bound holds, except with probability ǫend/ǫ:
4nH(U) ≥ 4nHˆMLE(U)−∆ent (D32)
where U is the string of size 4n corresponding to the raw key, and where
∆ent := log2
1
ǫ
+
√
8n log22(4n) log(2/ǫsm). (D33)
4. Gaussian states and covariance matrices
Using the AEP, the problem of computing the smooth min-entropy above can actually be reduced to the problem
of computing the Holevo information χ(Y ;E) between Bob’s measurement outcome Y and the register E. Thanks to
extremality properties of Gaussian states [19, 20], it is known that this quantity can be upper bounded by its value
computed for a Gaussian state with the same covariance matrix as the true state. We will now proceed and show
that it is in fact sufficient to know a symmetrized covariance matrix in order to get a bound on Eve’s information.
We need to analyze the symmetrization of the covariance matrix and show that without loss of security, one can
assume that it only depends on 3 variables. A general 2-mode covariance matrix with the appropriate symmetry (that
is, where the state has been symmetrized with the map Sym described in Eq. B22) is of the form:
γ =


x 0 z cos θ z sin θ
0 x z sin θ −z cos θ
z cos θ z sin θ y 0
z sin θ −z cos θ 0 y

 (D34)
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One can check that the determinant D of γ and the quantity ∆ = x2 + y2 − 2z2 (corresponding to the sum of the
determinants of the four 2× 2 blocks of γ) are independent of θ. This means that the symplectic eigenvalues of γ are
independent of θ. This was expected since θ corresponds to a phase-shift applied to Alice’s mode for instance.
The conditional 2 × 2 covariance matrix of Alice’s state given that Bob performed a heterodyne detection on his
part of the state is
γhetA|y = γA − γC(γB + 12)−1γTC (D35)
=
[
x− z21+y 0
0 x− z21+y
]
(D36)
which is also independent of θ. Here, γA, γB and γC are the 2× 2 blocks of γ.
We now recall that the Holevo information χ(Y ;E) computed for the Gaussian state of variance γ is given by [8]
χ(Y ;E) = g
[
ν1 − 1
2
]
+ g
[
ν2 − 1
2
]
− g
[
ν3 − 1
2
]
, (D37)
where ν1, ν2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of γ and ν3 is the symplectic eigenvalue of γ
het
A|y and g(x) := (x+1) log(x+
1)− x log(x). Let us introduce the function f(x, y, z, θ) := χ(Y ;E) for the Gaussian state with covariance matrix γ.
If θ = 0 and x and y are fixed, then one can check numerically that f is monotonically decreasing when z is
increasing, i.e. the function z 7→ f(x, y, z, 0) is decreasing. For simplicity, we write f(x, y, z) when the fourth variable
is zero. This has an intuitive interpretation: if the correlations between Alice and Bob decrease, then Eve’s information
increases. This implies that f(x, y, z cos θ, 0) ≥ f(x, y, z, 0) = f(x, y, z, θ). In other words, one can always assume
that the covariance matrix γ of the symmetrized state has the form
γ =


x 0 z 0
0 x 0 −z
z 0 y 0
0 −z 0 y

 . (D38)
This means that in order to upper bound the Holevo information between Bob’s measurement result and Eve for a
state ρ˜n, it is sufficient to obtain bounds on Σa,Σb and Σc defined in Eq. B20.
We now devote a section to give more details about the parameter estimation procedure.
Appendix E: Parameter Estimation in the protocol E0
We first describe the intuition behind the parameter estimation before proving some technical statements.
1. Principle
The Parameter Estimation procedure can be decomposed into two steps. First, Alice needs to compute a confidence
region for the three quantities ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉. Then, she should be able to obtain bounds on the covariance
matrix of the state she shared with Bob.
As we already mentioned, we assume here that ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉 are known. We relate the Parameter
Estimation procedure to a certain GendankenExperiment, which is described in Fig. 4. This experiment involves two
additional players A1 and A2 on Alice’s side as well as two others B1 and B2 on Bob’s side. Then, we will show that
the GedankenExperiment can in fact be efficiently simulated by Alice and Bob alone.
In the GedankenExperiment, Alice and Bob start by symmetrizing their quantum state by processing it through
a random network of beamsplitters and phase shifters. Then, they split their respective 2n modes into two sets of n
modes, which they forward to A1 and B1 for the first half, and to A2 and B2 for the second half. Now, both couples
(A1, B1 and A2, B2) are in position to perform a conventional quantum state tomography procedure: the couple of
players A1, B1 can try to estimate the state held by A2 and B2 and vice versa. Players A1 and B1 will be able to infer
a lower bound on the secret key rate that A2 and B2 can extract from their state. Similarly, A2 and B2 will be able
to infer a lower bound on the secret key rate that A1 and B1 can extract from their state. Adding the two bounds
gives a bound on the total secret key rate that Alice and Bob would have been able to extract from their overall
states, had they known the results of the two parameter estimation procedures. Then, we can show that because
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1. State Preparation: Alice and Bob each have access to the global state ρ2nAB.
2. State Symmetrization: A random unitary V is drawn from the Haar measure on U(2n). The state ρ2nAB is mapped
to (Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V
∗)B) ρ
2n
AB (Φ(V )A ⊗ Φ(V
∗)B)
†. This can be achieved by processing the optical modes through the
appropriate network of beamsplitters and phase-shifts.
3. Distribution to additional players: Alice forwards her first n modes to Agent A1 and the remaining n modes
to Agent A2. Similarly, Bob forwards his first n modes to B1 and the remaining n modes to B2. The first n modes
correspond to a bipartite state ρ1, the remaining modes to a state ρ2.
4. Measurement: Agents A1 and B1 measure their n respective modes with a heterodyne detection obtaining two
vectors X1 and Y1 of length 2n. Similarly, A2 and B2 measure their modes with heterodyne detection, obtain vectors
X2 and Y2. Finally, agents B1 and B2 publicly reveal Y1 and Y2.
5. Parameter Estimation: Agent A1 uses X1 and Y1 to compute a confidence region for the (averaged) covariance
matrix of ρ2. Similarly, A2 computes a confidence region for that of ρ1.
Figure 4: Parameter Estimation Procedure (GedankenExperiment)
the measurement is the same for key elements and for parameter estimation, Alice and Bob are able to simulate the
results of the actions of A1, A2, B1 and B2.
In order to analyze the GedankenExperiment, we show that it can be simulated by Alice if she initially knows the
values of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉. There are two main steps:
• Alice needs first to simulate the symmetrization and the distribution of the first n modes to A1. In particular,
she needs to compute a confidence region for the three parameters ‖X1‖2, ‖Y1‖2 and 〈X1, Y1〉, which correspond
to the norms and dot product of the vectors of measurements outcomes for A1 and B1. This will be analyzed
in Lemmas 7 and 8.
• Second, Alice needs to compute the confidence regions for the state ρ˜n2 that A1 and B1 would have inferred from
their measurement results X1 and Y1. This is the object of Lemma 9.
2. Proofs related to the analysis of Parameter Estimation
The first lemma is a standard concentration measure result in statistics.
Lemma 6 (Tail bounds for χ2 distribution [44]). Let U be a χ2 statistics with n degrees of freedom. For any x > 0,
Pr
[
U − n ≥ 2√nx+ 2x] ≤ e−x and Pr [U −X ≥ 2√nx] ≤ e−x. (E1)
The following two lemmas deal with the situation where Alice tries to simulate the distribution of ρ1 to A1 and
B2 and ρ2 to A2 and B2. In particular, given the knowledge of ‖X‖2, ‖Y ‖2 and 〈X,Y 〉, she can compute confidence
regions for ‖Xi‖2, ‖Yi‖2 and 〈Xi, Yi〉.
Since the symmetrization of the state with the map Sym described B22 commutes with the heterodyne measurement,
Alice can simulate the measurement of A1 by first measuring X and only later perform the random rotation. In
particular, the random vector X1 corresponds to the projection of X on a random subspace of complex dimension n.
Lemma 7. Given a vector X ∈ C2n, consider X1 the projection of X on a random subspace of dimension n, then
for ǫ ≥ 2e−n/2,
Pr
[
2‖X1‖2 ≥
[
1 + 1.5
√
ln(2/ǫ)
n
]
‖X‖2
]
≤ ǫ (E2)
Pr
[
2‖X1‖2 ≤
[
1− 2.2
√
ln(2ǫ)
n
]
‖X‖2
]
≤ ǫ. (E3)
Proof. By rotation invariance of the problem in C2n, one can fix the random subspace to be Span(|1〉, . . . , |n〉) where
(|1〉, . . . , |2n〉) is the canonical basis of C2n and take the vector |X〉 to be uniformly distributed on the sphere of
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radius ‖X‖ in C2n. We wish to get bounds on the random variable 〈X |Π|X〉 where Π = ∑ni=1 |i〉〈i|. Writing
|X〉 =∑2ni=1 αi|i〉, one obtains
〈X |Π|X〉 =
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 =
∑n
i=1 |αi|2∑n
i=1 |αi|2 +
∑2n
i=n+1 |αi|2
=
∑n
i=1 x
2
i∑n
i=1 x
2
i +
∑n
i=1 y
2
i
, (E4)
where xi and yi are i.i.d. normal variables N (0, 1) and the last equality follows from the well-known fact that one
can generate a uniformly distributed vector on a sphere by drawing i.i.d. normal variables for its coordinates and
normalizing the resulting vector. In particular, 〈X |Π|X〉 has the same distribution as UU+U ′ where U and U ′ are
independent χ2 random variables.
Using the bounds of Lemma 6 together with the union bound, one obtains
Pr
[
U ≥ n+ 2√nx+ 2x] ≤ e−x and Pr [U ≤ n− 2√nx] ≤ e−x,
Pr
[
U
U + U ′
≥ n+ 2
√
nx+ 2x
2(n+ x)
]
≤ 2e−x and Pr
[
U
U + U ′
≤ n− 2
√
nx
2(n+ x)
]
≤ 2e−x
Fix γ =
√
x/n. One can easily check that for γ ∈ [0, 1],
1 + 2γ + 2γ2
2(1 + γ)
≤ 1
2
[
1 +
3γ
2
]
and
1− 2γ
2(1 + γ2)
≥ 1
2
(1 − 2.2γ), (E5)
concluding the proof.
Lemma 8. Given two vectors X,Y ∈ R4n, consider X1 and Y1 the projections of X and Y on a random subspace of
dimension 2n, and x ≤ n/2, then
Pr
[
〈X,Y 〉 − 1.85
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) ≤ 2〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 〈X,Y 〉+ 1.85
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)] ≥ 1− 8e−x. (E6)
Proof. The proof can be reduced to the result of Lemma 7 since
〈X,Y 〉 = 1
4
[‖X + Y ‖2 − ‖X − Y ‖2] and 〈Xi, Yi〉 = 1
4
[‖Xi + Yi‖2 − ‖Xi − Yi‖2] . (E7)
The union bound insures that, except with probability at most 8e−x, one has (for x ≤ n),
[
1− 2.2
√
x
n
]
‖X + Y ‖2 ≤ 2‖X1 + Y1‖2 ≤
[
1 + 1.5
√
x
n
]
‖X + Y ‖2 (E8)
−
[
1 + 1.5
√
x
n
]
‖X − Y ‖2 ≤ −2‖X1 − Y1‖2 ≤ −
[
1− 2.2
√
x
n
]
‖X − Y ‖2. (E9)
Summing these inequalities and using that 2〈X,Y 〉 ≤ ‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2 gives:
〈X,Y 〉 − 1.85
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) ≤ 2〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 〈X,Y 〉+ 1.85
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) . (E10)
Note in particular that the following bounds hold:
Pr
[
〈Xi, Yi〉 ≤ 1
2
〈X,Y 〉 −
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]
≤ 4e−x (E11)
Pr
[
|〈X1, Y1〉 − 〈X2, Y2〉| ≥ 2
√
x
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]
≤ 8e−x. (E12)
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We now reason in terms of the covariance matrix of the Husimi Q-function, that is the function giving the probability
density function for the result of a heterodyne measurement. The averaged covariance matrix of the Q-function of a
(randomized) state ρnAB is
ΓQ =
n⊕
k=1


1
2 (Σa + 1) 0
Σc
2 ∗
0 12 (Σa + 1) ∗ −Σc2
Σc
2 ∗ 12 (Σb + 1) 0
∗ −Σc2 0 12 (Σb + 1)

 , (E13)
where some entries are not specified (∗). Because Alice has access to the heterodyne measurement of the first half of
the (symmetrized) state ρ˜2n, she is able to infer bounds on measurement outcomes for the second half, that will hold
except with some small probability.
The following lemma deals with the scenario where players A1 and B1 try to estimate the covariance matrix of ρ˜
n
2 ,
given their measurement outcomes of ρ˜n1 , namely the quantities ‖X1‖2, ‖Y1‖2 and 〈X1, Y1〉.
Lemma 9. Consider an 8n-dimensional probability distribution Q(X,Y ) where X = (X1, X2) ∈ R4n and Y =
(Y1, Y2) ∈ R4n, which is rotationally-invariant (when applying an orthogonal transformation and its transpose to X
and Y ). Then, for log(2/ǫ)2n ≤ 0.05, the following bounds hold:
Pr
[
‖X2‖2 ≥
[
1 + 5
√
log(2/ǫ)
2n
]
‖X1‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (E14)
Pr
[
‖Y2‖2 ≥
[
1 + 5
√
log(2/ǫ)
2n
]
‖Y1‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (E15)
Pr
[
〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ 〈X1, Y1〉 − 9
2
√
log(2/ǫ)
2n
(‖X1‖2 + ‖Y1‖2)
]
≤ 2ǫ. (E16)
Proof. The first two inequalities are a direct application of Lemma B.1 in Ref. [17] and of the observation that for
γ ∈ [0, 0.05], the following inequality holds:
1 + 2γ + 2γ2
1− 2γ ≥ 1 + 5γ. (E17)
Similarly, one can show that the following inequalities also hold:
Pr
[
‖X2‖2 ≤
[
1− 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2n
]
‖X1‖2
]
≤ ǫ, (E18)
Pr
[
‖Y2‖2 ≤
[
1− 4
√
log(2/ǫ)
2n
]
‖Y1‖2
]
≤ ǫ. (E19)
Using the same strategy as in the proof of Lemma 8, one can apply Inequalities E14, E15, E18 and E19 to vectors
Xi ± Yi, which immediately gives Inequality E16 thanks to the union bound.
We will also need techniques to bound the expectation of some random variables, and not only the values of the
random variables.
Let p(x, y) be a probability distribution defined on [0,∞[2 such that∫ a
0
∫ ∞
b
p(x, y)dxdy ≤ ǫ(a, b). (E20)
We define two sets A and Bδ for the random variable X :
A := {x ∈ [0, a]} and Bδ :=
{
x :
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy ≥ b+ δ
}
. (E21)
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Lemma 10. Let (bk)k=1..∞ a nondecreasing sequence such that b0 = b and limk→∞ =∞, then
P[A ∩Bδ] ≤ 1
δ
∞∑
k=1
bk+1ǫ(a, bk). (E22)
Proof. We wish to compute the probability that x ∈ A∩Bδ. Let us first compute the expectation of Y over that set:∫
x∈A∩Bδ
dxp(x)
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy =
∫
x∈A∩Bδ
dxp(x)
[∫ b
0
yp(y|x)dy +
∞∑
k=1
∫ bk+1
bk
yp(y|x)dy
]
(E23)
≤
∫
x∈A∩Bδ
bp(x)dx+
∞∑
k=1
bk+1ǫ(a, bk) (E24)
= bP[x ∈ A ∩Bδ] +
∞∑
k=1
bk+1ǫ(a, bk). (E25)
On the other hand, we know that:∫
x∈A∩Bδ
dxp(x)
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy ≥ (b + δ)P[x ∈ A ∩Bδ]. (E26)
Putting both inequalities together yields:
(b + δ)P[x ∈ A ∩Bδ] ≤ bP[x ∈ A ∩Bδ] +
∞∑
k=1
bk+1ǫ(a, bk), (E27)
which completes the proof.
Let us define two sets C and Dδ for the random variable X :
C := {x ∈ [a,∞[} and Dδ :=
{
x :
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy ≤ b − δ
}
. (E28)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If p(x, y) is such that
∫∞
a
∫ b
0
p(x, y)dxdy ≤ ǫ2(a, b), then
P[C ∩Dδ] ≤ bǫ2(a, b)
δ
. (E29)
Proof. We wish to compute the probability that x ∈ C ∩Dδ. Let us first compute the expectation of Y over that set:∫
x∈C∩Dδ
dxp(x)
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy =
∫
x∈C∩Dδ
dxp(x)
[∫ b
0
yp(y|x)dy +
∫ ∞
b
yp(y|x)dy
]
(E30)
= bP[x ∈ C ∩Dδ] +
∫
x∈C∩Dδ
dxp(x)
[∫ b
0
(y − b)p(y|x)dy +
∫ ∞
b
(y − b)p(y|x)dy
]
(E31)
≥ bP[x ∈ C ∩Dδ]− bǫ2(a, b) (E32)
On the other hand, we know that:∫
x∈C∩Dδ
dxp(x)
∫ ∞
0
yp(y|x)dy ≤ (b− δ)P[x ∈ C ∩Dδ]. (E33)
Putting both inequalities together yields:
bP[x ∈ C ∩Dδ]− bǫ2(a, b) ≤ (b − δ)P[x ∈ C ∩Dδ], (E34)
which concludes the proof.
We are now in a position to prove our main result regarding parameter estimation.
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3. Probability of the bad event
Consider that the PE test passed, i.e. that [γa ≤ Σmaxa ] ∧ [γb ≤ Σmaxb ] ∧ [γc ≥ Σminc ]. The problematic cases are the
ones where either A1 or A2 obtains values not compatible with their own parameter estimation procedure (i.e. they
would abort their own protocol), or when these procedures fail (i.e. the protocol did not abort but the estimation is
incorrect). For instance, the problematic cases for the estimation of A1 and A2 variances correspond to
E
‖X‖2
bad := [‖X1‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [‖X2‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [(E‖X2‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖X1‖2 ≤ a)] ∨ [(E‖X1‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖X2‖2 ≤ a)], (E35)
where a and b will be optimized later. Similarly, one can define:
E
‖Y ‖2
bad := [‖Y1‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [‖Y2‖2 ≥ a] ∨ [(E‖Y2‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖Y1‖2 ≤ a)] ∨ [(E‖Y1‖2 ≥ b) ∧ (‖Y2‖2 ≤ a)] (E36)
which is the bad event for the estimation of B1 and B2’s variances. Finally, the bad event for the correlations is:
E
〈X,Y 〉
bad := [〈X1, Y1〉 ≤ c] ∨ [〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ c] ∨ [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ∨ [(E〈X1, Y1〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X2, Y2〉 ≥ c)].
(E37)
Theorem 12. The probability of the bad event E
|X‖2
bad ∨E‖Y ‖
2
bad ∨E〈X,Y 〉bad is upper bounded by ǫ for the following choice
of parameters:
a =
1
2
[
1 + 1.5
√
log(36/ǫ)
n
]
‖X‖2 or a = 1
2
[
1 + 1.5
√
log(36/ǫ)
n
]
‖Y ‖2, (E38)
b = a
[
1 +
360
ǫ
exp[−n/25]
]
, (E39)
c =
1
2
〈X,Y 〉 −
√
log(72/ǫ)
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2), (E40)
d = c− 2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
√
8 log(18/ǫ)
n
. (E41)
Proof. Using Lemma 7, one can define ǫ1(a, y) = 2 exp
(
−2n [y−a5a ]2) such that
Pr
[
(‖X1‖2 ≤ a) ∧ (‖X2‖2 ≥ y)
] ≤ Pr [‖X2‖2 ≥ y
a
‖X1‖2
]
(E42)
≤ ǫ1(a, y). (E43)
Let us define bk = b+ ka such that b0 = b ≥ a and limk→∞ bk =∞. Let us introduce γ = b/a. One has:
∞∑
k=1
bk+1ǫ1(a, bk) = 2a
∞∑
k=0
(γ + 2 + k) exp
[
− n
25
(γ + k)2
]
(E44)
≤ 2a exp [−nγ2/25] ∞∑
k=0
(γ + 2+ k) exp
[
−2nγk
25
]
(E45)
≤ 8a(γ + 2) exp [−nγ2/25] (E46)
where the last inequality holds provided that exp
[− 2nγ25 ] ≤ 1/2. Using Lemma 10, one obtains that
Pr
[
(‖X1‖2 ≤ a) ∧ (E‖X2‖2 ≥ a+ δ)
] ≤ 20a
δ
exp [−n/25] . (E47)
We exploit Lemma 11 which states that, for c ≥ d,
Pr [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d− δ) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ≤ d
δ
· Pr [(〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ d) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] (E48)
≤ d
δ
· Pr [〈X1, Y1〉 − 〈X2, Y2〉 ≥ c− d] (E49)
≤ 8d
δ
exp
[
−n
[
c− d
2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]2]
. (E50)
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Let us choose d = c− 2δ. Then,
Pr [(E〈X2, Y2〉 ≤ c− 2δ) ∧ (〈X1, Y1〉 ≥ c)] ≤ 8c
δ
exp
[
−n
[
δ
2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
]2]
. (E51)
Let us choose the values of a, b, c and d such that each of the 18 individual events has a probability ǫ/18. The
probability pPEbad for the parameter estimation is then:
pPEbad ≤ Pr
[
E
‖X‖2
bad
]
+ Pr
[
E
‖Y ‖2
bad
]
+ Pr
[
E
〈X,Y 〉
bad
]
≤ ǫ. (E52)
This is achieved for:
a =
1
2
[
1 + 1.5
√
log(36/ǫ)
n
]
‖X‖2 (E53)
b = a
[
1 +
360
ǫ
exp[−n/25]
]
(E54)
c =
1
2
〈X,Y 〉 −
√
log(72/ǫ)
n
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2) (E55)
d = c− 2(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2)
√
8 log(18/ǫ)
n
(E56)
where the second equality is a consequence of Eq. E47, the third equality is a consequence of Eq. E11 and the last
equality results from Eq. E51 (and noting that δ ≥ 4cǫ/9 for reasonable parameters).
Let us finally define:
γa :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖X‖2 − 1, (E57)
γb :=
1
2n
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫPE)
n
]
‖Y ‖2 − 1, (E58)
γc :=
1
2n
〈X,Y 〉 − 5
√
log(8/ǫPE)
n3
(‖X‖2 + ‖Y ‖2). (E59)
where we choose a regime of n such that[
1 + 1.5
√
log(36/ǫ)
n
][
1 +
360
ǫ
exp[−n/25]
]
≤ 1 + 2
√
log(36/ǫ)
n
, (E60)
which is the case in all practical situations. Moreover, we note that√
32 log(18/ǫ) +
√
log(72/ǫ) ≤
√
2(32 log(18/ǫ) + log(72/ǫ)) (E61)
≤ 10
√
log(8/ǫ) (E62)
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 13. The probability that the Parameter Estimation Test passes, that is, [γa ≤ Σmaxa ]∧ [γb ≤ Σmaxb ]∧ [γc ≥
Σminc ] and that Eve’s information is larger than the one computed for the Gaussian state with covariance matrix
characterized by Σmaxa ,Σ
max
b and Σ
min
c is upper-bounded by ǫPE.
4. Analysis of the Parameter Estimation
Consider the simulated protocol where Alice and Bob first symmetrize their state, then distribute the first half of
their modes to players A1 and B2 and the second half of their modes to A2 and B2. The goal of A1 and B1 is to
measure their own modes and infer some confidence region for the covariance matrix of the state shared by A2 and
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B2. Similarly, A2 and B2 measure their state and try to infer a confidence region for the covariance matrix of A1 and
B1.
The bad event that we considered in the previous section corresponds to the case where the parameter estimation
test of the true protocol passes but a problem occurs for either one of the virtual parameter estimation tests, i.e. one
does not pass (in which case the virtual protocol would have aborted) or both virtual tests pass but their conclusion
is not valid (i.e. the covariance matrix of the remaining modes is not in the predicted confidence region).
Recall that if the state τ12 represents a quantum state on 2n modes, and if τ1 (resp. τ2) corresponds to the
first n (resp. last n) modes, then the strong subadditivity of the Holevo information implies that χ(Y1Y2;E)τ12 ≤
χ(Y1;E)τ1 + χ(Y2;E)τ2 .
In particular, if we denote by τPE = 1pPEΠρ
⊗(2n)Π (with pPE = tr (Πρ⊗(2n))) the quantum state conditioned on
passing the Parameter Estimation test, then with probability 1 − ǫ/p, the Holevo information between the string Y
corresponding to Bob’s heterodyne measurement results and Eve’s quantum register is:
χ(Y ;E)τPE ≤ 2nf(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc ), except with probability ǫPE/p. (E63)
Appendix F: Security of the protocol E0 against collective attacks
In this section, we finally put the various pieces of the proof together and show that the protocol E0 described above
is secure against collective attacks. We will use superscripts m, n or 2n to recall the length of the various strings.
Our goal is to obtain a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of the string U given Eve’s information, that is, her
quantum system E and the public transcript C of the protocol, when the protocol did not abort. The smoothing
parameter ǫsm will be optimized later.
Let us write τ = 1pPρ
⊗(2n)P with p := tr
(
Pρ⊗(2n)
)
, the quantum state conditioned on both the Parameter
Estimation and the Error Correction tests passing. Without loss of generality, this passing probability can be assumed
to be at least ǫ since if the abort probability is greater than 1 − ǫ, the protocol is automatically ǫ-secure. Let us
define some error parameter ǫerr := ǫPE + ǫcor. The analysis of the Parameter Estimation test implies that, except
with probability at most ǫerr/p, one can upper bound the quantum mutual information between Y and E as follows:
χ(Y ;E)τ ≤ 2nf(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc ). (F1)
This is because for a given covariance matrix, the Holevo information is maximized for the Gaussian state with
same second moment [20] and the function f exactly computes the Holevo information for the Gaussian state with
covariance matrix
⊕2n
i=1
[
Σmaxa 12 Σ
min
c σz
Σminc σz Σ
max
b 12
]
.
The chain rule for the smooth min-entropy gives:
Hǫsmmin(U
m|EC)τ ≥ Hǫsmmin(Um|E)τ − log |C|. (F2)
Recall that log |C| = leakEC since we neglect here the communication where Bob reveals the values of ‖Y ‖ and ‖Y −Yˆ ‖
to Alice (which only consumes a small constant number of bits). The smooth min-entropy can be bounded further
by:
Hǫsmmin(U
m|E)τ ≥ H(Um|E)τ −∆AEP (F3)
= H(Um)τ − χ(Um;E)τ −∆AEP (F4)
≥ 4nHˆMLE(U)−∆ent − χ(Y 2n;E)τ −∆AEP, (F5)
where the last inequality holds except with probability ǫent/ǫ. Eq. F3 results from the Asymptotic Equipartition
Property and ∆AEP is defined in Eq. D25. Eq. F4 results from the definition of the Holevo information between the
classical string Um and Eve’s quantum system. Eq. F5 results from the bound on the entropy as a function of the
empirical entropy and from the data-processing inequality and ∆ent is defined in Eq. D33.
Finally, except with probability (ǫerr + ǫent)/ǫ, the smooth min-entropy is lower-bounded as follows:
Hǫsmmin(U
m|EC)τ ≥ 4nHˆMLE(U)− 2nf(Σmaxa ,Σmaxb ,Σminc )− leakEC −∆ent −∆AEP. (F6)
The Leftover Hash Lemma concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
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Appendix G: A security proof against general attacks without active symmetrization
We sketch here how to use the Postselection technique [17] to obtain a security proof against general attacks for the
case of a direct reconciliation without applying any active symmetrization. The idea is very similar to the Parameter
Estimation step of E0. Alice prepares 4n two-mode squeezed vacuum states and sends the appropriate modes to Bob.
Then Alice and Bob simulate the symmetrization of their state, split their respective modes into two sets of size 2n
and give the corresponding modes to additional players A1 and A2 for Alice, and B1 and B2 for Bob. Players A1 and
B1 perform the energy test, which conditioned on passing, guarantees that the protocol E0 applied by A2 and B2 will
be secure, and similarly players A2 and B2 perform an energy test which gives some security guarantees for the keys
obtained by A1 and B1 when applying E0 to their respective modes. This simulation can be done by Alice and Bob
as before because the energy test commutes with the measurements used for the key distillation.
The obvious open question is whether an active symmetrization is really needed in the case of a reverse reconciliation.
We believe that this is not the case, and that this is a artifact of the current version of the Postselection technique.
It is very natural to conjecture that a better version of the Postselection technique, exploiting all the symmetries
of the protocol in phase-space could be sufficient to prove the security of the protocol without any need for active
symmetrization.
Finally, it should be noted that a similar kind of active symmetrization seems to be also required for protocols such
as BB84 if Alice and Bob discard all the events where Bob’s detectors did not register a photon. Indeed, postselecting
on the events where the detectors clicked is a form of reverse reconciliation which breaks a priori the symmetry of
the protocol, i.e. its invariance under joint permutations of the subsystems of Alice and Bob in this case. For BB84,
performing an active symmetrization of the data means drawing uniformly at random a permutation of size n, a task
with complexity O(n log n). Of course, this is doable in theory, but not really practical.
For this reason, the question of symmetrization is not relevant only for CV QKD, but also for protocols such as
BB84 when considered in a practical setting where losses are large.
